A recent County Court case of Plymouth Community Homes Limited v Hammond [2026] (Plymouth) considered the issue of forced access in the context of access injunctions once more, following the other recent cases of Sovereign, Southern Housing and Mohammed. 

Firstly, to recap on the other recent case law – the issue of forced access has caused ongoing conflict at County Court level. 

In 2024, a Circuit Judge in the case of Sovereign was persuaded that an order for forced access could be made. He justified that by reference to provisions in the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR 70.2A), which allow another party to take action to comply with an order when the party who should have done it has not (a ‘disobedient party’). See our previous note here.

In contrast, in 2025 a District Judge in Southern decided that allowing a landlord to force access went beyond CPR 70.2A and refused to grant an order permitting forced entry. The Judge focused on two things. Firstly, he placed emphasis on a tenant’s right to exclusive possession and was not convinced that CPR 70.2A allowed him to depart from that (to overturn existing legal principles). Secondly, the judge also did not think that provision of access was an “act” which any party other than the tenant could complete as per the wording of CPR 70.2A - a landlord would be forcing entry, not “providing access”. See our previous note here.

Then, swinging back in the other direction in 2026, we have the case of Taylor v Mohammed [2026]. Here, the District Judge was persuaded that the reasoning within Southern Housing was principally incorrect and, in his judgment, dealt with the first issue raised in Southern. The Judge here did not agree that a forced entry injunction term was departing from the existing law on exclusive possession. This is because when granting an access injunction, the Court is simply giving effect to a tenant’s already existing contractual consent for access: a landlord’s right of access is usually expressly included as a term and condition of tenancy in the tenancy agreement and even if not, access rights are also implied by law in certain circumstances. It follows that, where a Court orders a tenant to allow access, they are effectively just ordering the tenant to facilitate access in accordance with the existing covenants of their tenancy. Therefore, in granting a forced entry injunction term, the Court is being asked to use the CPR to give effect to underlying common law (the contractual terms of tenancy), not overturn the law on exclusive possession. The judge was therefore happy to make an order permitting forced entry.

The latest case of Plymouth offers a further perspective on the issue of forced access and the ongoing dispute over the application of CPR 70.2A.  Specifically, the Judge considered the second issue raised in Southern, i.e. the “act” that the ‘disobedient party’ has not done and whether the court can substitute the ‘disobedient party’ with the landlord or another person to carry out the act. 

The judge reasoned that where an injunction order requires the tenant to give access, there is no longer any element of choice for the tenant in the provision of access. Therefore, allowing a landlord to force entry is consistent with the terms of the order and the CPR. The judge considered whether the “act” required remained ‘fundamentally or essentially the same, although the method may be different’.  The Judge accepted that provision of access cannot be performed in the same way by the landlord compared to the tenant. (I.e. the tenant can open the door from the inside and allow entry, whereas the landlord would have to drill the locks from the outside in order to open the door.) However, if the act is the obtaining of access, then it can be fundamentally and essentially achieved by a landlord forcing or changing the lock to secure access. In accordance with the decision in Mohammed, CPR 70.2A was considered a mechanism for allowing a landlord to enforce its contractual rights and does not seek to change the substantive law. Therefore, the judge was content that CPR70.2A allowed him to grant a term permitting forced access. 

Practically speaking, because all of these cases have been decided at County Court level, they are not binding. It follows that any Judge who is considering a request for forced access is not bound by any one case and it will instead fall to each individual Judge as to which case and reasoning they find more persuasive. 

Ultimately, until such time as the matter of forced access is dealt with at the Court of Appeal, landlords should treat Plymouth as another helpful but non-binding authority in support of applications for forced entry terms in an injunction order. As ever, it will remain a matter of a Judge’s discretion.

As the volume of case law on this issue is now building, we have prepared a table indicating the basic position of each case in relation to forced access for ease of reference. 

If you require any further information or assistance in relation to the issue of access, please contact us - Rebecca Sembuuze or Mollie McQuade.