The recent Court of Appeal case, Abdelrahman v Islington LBC [2025], offered useful guidance as to who is considered a ‘stepchild’ for discretionary succession. It concludes that a stepchild is still defined as a child of a person’s spouse or civil partner and therefore does not include the child of someone you are merely cohabiting with. 

Background 

The claimant originally brought this claim against Islington London Borough Council (the defendant), due to their refusal to grant her a discretionary succession as a result of her falling outside the parameters of their policy. 

The claimant’s mother, Ms Patel, had engaged in an intimate relationship with the secure tenant of the defendant, Mr Seales, the claimant’s father. They were never married and Ms Patel had her own property in Luton. Mr Seales passed away on 31 March 2021. The claimant applied to succeed Mr Seales' tenancy under the defendant’s discretionary succession policy, deeming herself to be a stepchild due to the relationship of her parents. 

This case hinged on the meaning of ‘stepchild’, which in the County Court was deemed to be the child of a person’s spouse or civil partner by a previous marriage. As the claimant’s parents were never married, the claimant fell outside of the scope of the defendant’s discretionary succession policy and was not entitled to succeed Mr Seales' tenancy as she was not deemed to be a ‘stepchild’. The Judge found that to include the claimant as a ‘stepchild’, they would be expanding the defendant’s policy. 

The claimant was ineligible for a statutory succession under the Housing Act 1985 as the tenancy was granted after 01 April 2012. 

Appeal 

This decision was appealed by the claimant, who attempted to introduce new arguments on the basis that the meaning of ‘stepchild’ should include biological children of a person living with the deceased as if they were married (making the claimant eligible to succeed). The Court of Appeal did not allow the new argument on the basis that it required evidence and had it been permitted, the original trial would have been conducted differently. 

The Grounds of the Appeal can be summarised as: 

• Ground 1: The definition of ‘stepchild’ should adopt a modern approach and not be confined to legal or blood relationships. 
• Ground 2: Including the claimant under the meaning of ‘stepchild’ would not be expanding the defendant’s policy. 

This matter essentially boiled down to the interpretation of the defendant’s discretionary succession policy. 

Within their interpretation of the policy, the Court of Appeal recognised that the defendant’s policy does not remain in place indefinitely. The policy can be withdrawn and changed at the defendant’s discretion. It therefore followed that the policy took into account recent case law regarding a ‘modern family’. It was the policy’s purpose to create a closed category of identifiable people capable of succeeding a tenancy without the need for investigation by the defendant. To adopt the definition of a stepchild argued by the claimant, the defendant would likely incur costly and lengthy investigations to determine who is or is not a stepchild. 

The Court of Appeal deemed that, from a dictionary definition, a ‘stepchild’ is a child of a married person from a previous relationship. 

Outcome 

The Court of Appeal found that the claimant did not fall within the definition of a ‘stepchild’ under the defendant’s policy and was not entitled to succeed Mr Seales' tenancy. The appeal failed. 

Simply speaking, a local authority’s policy relating to discretionary succession is designed to create a pool of individuals entitled to succeed. This is aimed at ensuring any tenancy officer can follow this policy with ease. The definitions are narrow and are not to be construed to fit modern relationships, as showcased by this case. 

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